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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plai~ttiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS CHARLES PETERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7757 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
, On March 25, 1951, during the nighttime, the Torch 
Tavern, 477 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was 
broken into and articles excee~ing $50.00 value were felon· 
iously taken therefrom. 
Charles L. Means, the owner, closed the tavern at 1:00 
a.m., March 25. M. W. Olsen of the City Police Department 
·""" 2, 
"' 
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informed Mr. Means later the same morning of the burglary 
and they returned to the tavern where Mr. Means listed 
articles missing, subsequently identified at the trial as Exhibits 
A, B, C, D and ·E (Tr. 43-52). 
Early March 25th witnesses Daniel Dunn and Edward 
Peterson were on Fifth South Street approximately 75 feet 
east of the Torch 1·avern; both saw a car come out of the 
alley parallel with the east side of the Torch Tavern at an 
accelerated speed; turn west from the alley on Fifth South; 
and continue west at a high rate of· speed. Both noticed this car 
because of the high rate of speed and open trunk of the 
car which held a dark, square object. Mr. Peterson saw two 
persons in the car and noted the license number 484. Both 
witnesses investigated the alley 3:nd found· the broken window 
and open door of the Torch Tavern. Mr. Peterson testified 
that a phone call was placed to the police between 3: 30 and 
4:00 a.m.; Mr. Dunn testified that the phone call was placed 
to the police at approximately 5 minutes __ to 4:00. a.m.; the 
police arrived 8 to 10 minutes later (Tr. 71-103). 
Special Officer Jack Merrick, approximately 10 minutes 
before 4:00 o'clock on the morning of March 25th, 1951, 
saw a car proceeding at a fast speed north on Fifth West near 
Second South; he noted two persons in the car with the trunk 
forced up with a large object; he followed the car into an 
alley betWeen North Temple and South Temple on Fifth 
West; two men jumped out of the car and ran and Officer 
Merrick chased the driver. He fired tWo shots and the driver 
surrendered and identified himself as Chick or Chuck Peter-
son. Officer Merrick took Chuck Peterson to the Salt Lake 
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Planing ~1ills to phone the Salt Lake City Police Dispatcher, 
at which time defendant escaped. The phone call was placed 
at approximately 4:00 a.m. 
Officer Merrick, at the trial, positively identified the de-
fendant as one of the persons he followed in the car, chased 
and apprehended (Tr. 103-121). 
The numbers of the license plate of the car containing 
the stolen articles were 484. The car was owned by the de-
fendant. The articles were identified at the trial as exhibits 
A, B, C, D and E (Tr. 106, 107, 123-130). 
Defendant later turned himself in to the Salt Lake Police 
department and submitted a confession of a third person to 
exculpate himself (Tr. 154). 
Defendant was convicted of Grand Larceny in the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and from that verdict appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
EXHIBIT NO. 1. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVI-
DENCE TO RETURN A VERDICT OF .f\CQUITAL FOR 
DEFENDANT. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE SCOPE OF EX-
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AMINATION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS; THE VERDIC1~ 
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
EXHIBIT NO. 1. 
Defendant's proposed Exhibit I was an alleged confession 
by Charles Olmsted, offered by defendant to exculpate him-
self. Respondent submits that the objections by the State to 
the admission of the alleged confession as being self-serving 
and heresay were well taken and properly sustained by the 
Court. Appellant contends that the a,.Ueged confession was 
part of the res gestae and thus admissible. 
In the case of Dodd v. State (1925) 20 Okla. Cr. 311, 233 
Pac. 503, res gestae is defined as follows: 
What constitutes res gestae is _often a complex and 
difficult question. The term is not capable of a defini-
tion which will fit all cases, and of necessity must 
be left in some measure to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. In general tenus, it means the circumstances, 
facts and declarations which shed light upon and ex-
pl~in the principal fact, and which are voluntary and 
spontaneous in their nature, and so nearly contempor-
aneous as to preclude the idea of deliberation or fabri-
cation. Price v. State} 1 Okla, Cr. 358, 98 Pac. 447; 
34 Cyc. 1642; 22 C. ]. 454, Sec. 543. 
In the case of Clingan v. State ( 1919) 15 Okla. Cr. 483, 
178 Pac. 486, the court said: 
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Spontaneous declarations springing out of and con-
temporaneous with the principal fact sought to be 
proven, and which are made at a time so near to it 
as to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication 
\vhether they be the declarations of the deceased or 
of the defendant, are generally considered admissible 
as part of the res gestae. 
Defendant's testimony was that approximately one hour 
and forty-five minute elapsed between his escape a~d the time 
he and Olmsted met, when the alleged confession was written 
(Tr. 152, 153). 
The authorities require that declarations be spontaneous, 
contemporaneous, and made at a time which would preclude 
deliberation and fabrication to be admissible as part of the 
res gestae. The lapse of time and the circumstances under which 
the alleged confession was written preclude any spontaniety, 
and show ample opportunity for deliberation, collusion,. crea-
tion and faslification of an alibi. Neither can an argument be 
made_ that the alleged confession was contemporaneous with 
the crime, and for that reason admissible. 
Respondent submits that the allege4 confession Wt3.S 
properly excluded. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVI-
DENCE TO RETURN A VERDICT OF ACQUITAL FOR 
DEFENDANT. 
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Appellant cites the Utah cases State v. Burch, 100 Utah 
414, 115 P 2d 911~ and State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 100 P 
681, (appellant's brief pages 1~· and 14) for_ the proposition 
that where circumstantial evidence is used to prove the guilt 
of defendant and the evidence is such-that reasonable men can-
not differ upon the fact that it includes a reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence of the defendant, the question is one of law for 
the Court, and not a question for the jury. · 
Respondent concedes that such was the holding in the 
cases cited, but submits that the principle is not applicable to 
the case at bar. Appellant fails to point out that the cases 
cited had peculiar fact situations and dealt with only circum-
stantial evidence. In the Burch case this Court stated: 
• 
tCThe present case is out of the ordinary in that 
there is not one ultimate fact necessary for a conviction 
that is substantiated by direct evidence. 
* * * * 
In a criminal case a motion for directed verdict 
raises the question of whether or not; as a matter of 
law, there is substantial evidence of accused's guilt. 
State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 266 P 261. See also 
State v. Gordon, 28 Utah 15, 76 P 882; State v. Karas, 
43 Utah 506, 136 P 788. Where- the alleged offense 
and the . accused's alleged connection therewith rest 
wholly upon circumstantial evidence, which evidence, 
as a matter of law, is reasonably consistent with the 
innocence of the accused then this Court must hold 
that there is not substanitial evidence to support the 
· guilt of the accused. 97 Am. St. Rep. 776, Sec. 5 com-
mencing 8th line. 
The conclusion that a verdict of acquital should be directed 
by the Court in the ca·se at bar is unsound because it is founded 
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upon the faulty premise that the verdict was based solely upon 
circumstantial evidence and not upon any direct evidence. 
The trial record reveals that the State presented direct evidence 
in addition to circumstanital evidence which was sufficient 
to convict the defendant of grand larceny. 
103-36-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943 defines larceny as 
follows: 
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, 
leading or driving away the personal property of an-
other. Possession of property recently stolen, when 
the person in possession fails to make a satisfactory 
explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of 
guilt." 
The evidence of record clearly connects defendant with the 
crime charged. The time of the burglary was established by 
testimony of Daniel Dunn, Edward Peterson, and Clarence 
Means as between 3:30 and 4:00 A.M. Daniel Dunn testified 
he saw a car leave the alley by the tavern with a large object 
in the trunk, and Edward Peterson testified he saw the same 
car' license number 484, with an object in the trunk and two 
men in the car, and the time established was just before 4:00 
A.M. (Tr. 93, 94, 73, 74, 43, 44). Pursuit of the same car 
with the object in the trunk by Officer Merrick was approxi-
mately 3: 50 A.M. Officer Merrick testified to following de-
fendant in the car into an alley where defendant jumped from 
the car and ran to avoid arrest. Officer Merrick gave chase, 
fired two shots and defendant surrendered (Tr. 103-121). 
The articles stolen from the tavern were found in defend-
ant's car, the license of which bears the number 484. The 
object in the trunk was identified as the television set taken 
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from the tavern and,· with the other articles, identified at the 
trial as exhibits A; B, C, D and E (Tr. 43-52, 106, 107, 122-
130). Defendant subsequently escaped (Tr. 117). Positive 
idenification of defendant was made at the time of his arrest 
and at the trial (Tr. 105, 119, 120, 121). 
Respondent submits that the flight of the defendant, 
chase by the Officer, apprehension and definite identification 
of the defendant while in possession of recently-stolen goods, 
and subsequent escape by defendant, was sufficient to go to 
the jury and to sustain the verdict. 
. POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE SCOPE OF EX-
AMINATION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS; THE VERDICT 
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
On cross-examination defendant was asked and answered, 
stating particular felonies. he had been convicted of previously, 
and appellant cites as error the trial court's failure to instruct 
the jury circumscribing their consideration of evidence as 
to prior convictions. 
This Court should note that the defense raised no objec-
tion at . the time the question as. to prior . convictions was pro-
pounded; also defense. did not request, . either orally or in 
\Vriting, an instruction which WOuld clarify the COnsideration 
to be give11: in the cross examination as to prior convictions. 
Nor was ap.y objectiop..· made to the .instructions submitted to 
10 
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the jury by the court. Respondent submits that if error was 
committed by omission of such an instruction, it was not such 
as to be prejudicial to the defendant. 
Appellant cites State t'. Coho ( 1936), 90 Utah 89, 60 
P 2nd 952, as authority to relieve appellant of the technical 
formalities required in a criminal case to properly present 
and raise issues for argument before this Court. That case 
involved a homicide charge. Because of the seriousness of 
the charge, this Court there relaxed the formalities of ob-
jections and exceptions necessary to properly present argu-
ments before this Court. We submit that in the case at bar 
appellant's argument is not well taken. 
Appellant also urges that the verdict of the jury was con-
trary to law and the evidence. There are numerous cases 
which cite the rule that questions of fact are the sole preroga-
tive of the jury. In the case of State v. Hitesman ( 1921), 58 
Utah 62, 198 P. 769, a prosecution for larceny, this court 
stated: 
"While the law is to the effect that a· jury may not 
arbitrarily ignore or disregard credible evidence, but 
must consider all evidence, they, nevertheless, need 
not blindly accept every explanation or statement that 
the one who is accused of the larceny may make in his 
own exculpation. The jury, in considering all the facts 
and circumstances in evidence, rna y refuse to give 
credence to defendant's statements or explanations, 
or to those of his witnesses, if such statements or ex-
planations, in view of all the facts and circumstances, 
seem unreasonable or not well founded in fact. Where, 
as here, property recently stolen is found in the pos-
session of the accused, it is for the jury to say whether 
his explanations and statements respecting that posses-
11 
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sion are satisfactory or otherwise. See State v. Gurr, 
40 Utah 162, 120 Pac. 209, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 320, 
vthere the question is considered a.1d the authorities 
supporting the foregoing statement of the law are 
collated." 
To the same effect see State v. Williams, ( 1917) 49 Utah 
~·36, 164 Pac. 253. 
Respondent contends that the evidence was sufficient to 
go to the jury and that the verdict of the jury should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is submitted that the evidence in this 
case fully supports the verdict and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
FRANCIS C. LUND, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
12 
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